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Slowly, the body of civil disputes that are guaranteed a right to a
jury trial under the Seventh AmendmenP is contracting. It is doubtful
that the amendment will ever be repealed, but its content is being
chipped away and there is increasingly little distance left between the
current interpretation of the amendment and no amendment at all.
The agent of this erosion is the Supreme Court. If deeds speak
louder than words, the message of the Supreme Court is that civil ju-
ries have, at best, a limited future. The Court writes frequently about
the sanctity of the jury system,2 and a Justice occasionally laments the
erosion of the traditional sphere of jury cases,3 but the Court never-
theless continues to exempt more and more cases from the scope of
the Seventh Amendment.
This Article examines the exception that now threatens to swal-
low the rule: the public rights doctrine. Under this doctrine, a poten-
tially huge body of civil disputes, including virtually all administrative
law cases, are exempt from the Seventh Amendment. Although the
philosophical basis for the public rights doctrine is as old as the Con-
stitution, its lineage suggests nothing to justify this exception.
1. The Seventh Amendment reads: "In Suits at common law, where the value in con-
troversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States, than ac-
cording to the rules of the Common Law."
2. Jacob v. New York, 315 U.S. 752 (1942). See also, Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221,
222 (1963) ("The federal policy favoring jury trials is of historic and continuing strength.");
Baylis v. Travellers' Ins. Co., 113 U.S. 316, 321 (1885) ("This constitutional right this court
has always guarded with jealousy."); see also Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S.
558, 564-66 (1990).
3. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 339 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
The development of the public rights doctrine is a consequence of
the Constitution's brevity. The Constitution devotes about one page
to the definition of the judiciary.4 Due to the Constitution's brief and
broad treatment of the number of courts and their respective jurisdic-
tions, one of the first questions addressed by the judiciary was what
set of disputes, if any, fell outside of the judicial system. One aspect of
this question was whether, in a democracy, the government could
claim a right to sovereign immunity. At least as to the federal govern-
ment, this question was quickly answered in the affirmative.5 This re-
sulted in the conceptual segregation of those cases involving the
government as a party into what were known as "public rights" cases.
The Supreme Court held that as a consequence of sovereign im-
munity, public rights cases fell outside some of the constitutional man-
dates governing other legal proceedings. According to this reasoning,
if the government could only be sued with its consent, then the gov-
ernment could place whatever restrictions it wished on the suit. One
of the primary applications of this principle was that the government
did not have to consent to a jury trial.6 In other words, public rights
cases were excepted from the Seventh Amendment.
The Seventh Amendment, of course, pre-dated any of these pub-
lic rights decisions, and without the Seventh Amendment, it is unlikely
that there would have been any Constitution at all. At the time the
Constitution was proposed, the people of the United States greatly
distrusted government, and saw the absence of a guaranteed civil jury
right as a reason, standing alone, to reject adoption of the Constitu-
tion; only by promising the Seventh Amendment did the Federalists
secure adoption of the Constitution in several of the state ratification
debates. 7 The Seventh Amendment captured the notion that central-
ized authority, wherever evident, should be checked by the oversight
of the people.
In light of the history of the Seventh Amendment, the develop-
ment of the public rights exception is misplaced. This is especially
true as the Seventh Amendment is grounded on the concept of the
citizens' right to check government power. Therefore, the most un-
likely exception to the amendment would be in cases involving the
government as a party. Strangely, however, the public rights cases did
not address this philosophical tension. When the Court developed a
4. U.S. CONsT. art. III.
5. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 411-12 (1821).
6. Den v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284-85 (1856).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 15-25.
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public rights exception to the Seventh Amendment, it neglected the
philosophical underpinnings of the Seventh Amendment and instead
focused on the consequences of recognizing sovereign immunity.
Moreover, in recent years, the Court has greatly expanded the
scope of the public rights doctrine. This expansion, arguably tenuous
in its own right, almost entirely divorces the public rights doctrine
from its sovereign immunity roots. Now, a dispute is considered to
involve "public rights" any time Congress creates "a seemingly (pri-
vate) right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme
as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited in-
volvement by the Article III judiciary."' Under this definition, Con-
gress has near-dictatorial, powers to withhold a broad spectrum of
disputes from the judiciary and place them into legislative courts, such
as tax courts, bankruptcy courts, or administrative law courts.
The justification for the expanded public rights doctrine is based
on the almost sacrosanct doctrine of separation of powers. Under this
reasoning, Article I defines spheres of responsibility and power re-
served exclusively to the legislative branch, and the legislative branch
may exercise these powers however it wishes, including the creation of
dispute resolution bodies not subject to the Article III branch's check.
The redefinition of public rights exponentially expands the type
and number of disputes enveloped by the doctrine, thereby expanding
those disputes exempt from Seventh Amendment guarantees. Yet, as
with the original development of the public rights doctrine, this broad
expansion has occurred without reference to the underlying philoso-
phy of the Seventh Amendment itself.
This Article addresses whether the Court's analysis of the public
rights exception to the Seventh Amendment is sound when considered
in light of the historical underpinnings of the Seventh Amendment. In
other words, if the Court had considered the rationale behind the Sev-
enth Amendment, would the Court have created a "public rights"
exception?
This Article first asks if there should be a public rights exception
to the Seventh Amendment under the traditional definition of "public
rights." Next, this Article addresses whether there should be an ex-
ception to the Seventh Amendment for cases coming within the ex-
panded definition of public rights. This Article answers both
questions in the negative: there should not be a public rights exception
to the Seventh Amendment.
8. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 594 (1985).
S PUBLIC RIGHTS DOCTRINE
L A Concise History of the Drafting and Adoption of the
Seventh Amendment
The written record memorializing the emergence of the Seventh
Amendment is not voluminous.9 However, one theme that emerges
relatively clearly is that eighteenth-century Americans viewed civil ju-
ries as a critical check on government power. The people wanted ju-
ries because they perceived the judiciary as an arm of the government,
and the people distrusted government.
The comments of our nation's founders in the late eighteenth
century provide repeated reference to the importance early Ameri-
cans placed on the notion of the civil jury as a critical check on the
power of government. Patrick Henry, speaking in the Virginia Consti-
tutional Convention, called civil juries the "best appendage of free-
dom," one "which our ancestors secured [with] their lives and
property."' 0 Thomas Jefferson remarked, "I consider trial by jury as
the only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can
be held to the principles of its constitution."" Thomas Paine felt civil
juries were an extension, of a natural right.' The Federalists opined
that eliminating civil jury rights could lead to insurrection. 3 Indeed,
when Alexander Hamilton defended the Constitution's omission of a
civil jury trial guarantee, he did not contend that the right was unim-
portant, but rather that the silence of the Constitution did not impinge
upon it.14
9. The Author has published a previous Article on the Seventh Amendment, Ken-
neth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil Jury
Trial, 53 OHIO ST. LJ. 1005 (1992). This Part of the present Article is largely drawn from
that article. A comprehensive history of the Seventh Amendment is not necessary to un-
derstand the topics the present article covers. For thorough histories, see Edith G. Hen-
derson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REv. 289 (1966); Charles
W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639
(1973). For a more concise, but still helpful, history of the origins in Western jurispru-
dence, see 5 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.02 (2d ed.
1993). See also Jack Pope, The Jury, 39 TEx. L. REv. 426 (1961).
10. 3 Tim DEBATE IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 324, 544 (Jonathan Elliott ed., 1836)[hereinafter ELLIOTr'S
DEBATES].
11. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine (July 11, 1789), in The Papers of
Thomas Jefferson, at 267 (Julian P. Boyd ed. 1958). Jefferson would later express surprise
at his perception that the populace would give up the right without protest. See BERNARD
SCHWARTz, TmE BILL OIV RiGHTs: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 609 (1971).
12. SCHWARTZ, supra note 11, at 316.
13. Id. at 455.
14. See THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton).
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The states did not share Hamilton's view. When the Constitution
was sent to the states for ratification, it was met with immediate con-
cern that it inadequately guarded individual liberties, and that "in civil
causes it did not secure the trial of facts by a jury."'" Thus, when
Hamilton reflected on the entire range of stated objections to the
Constitution, he surmised that the one which met with the most suc-
cess in his state, "and perhaps in several of the other States, was that
relative to the want of a constitutional provision for the trial by jury in
civil cases."' 6 As Hamilton indicated, the Anti-Federalists, who op-
posed ratification of the Constitution, rallied support by asserting that
the Constitution would abolish civil juries altogether.17
One commentator illustrates the divisiveness created over reten-
tion of a constitutional right to jury trials:
Within a month the whole country was divided into Federalist
and Anti-Federalist parties. The almost complete lack of any
bill of rights was a principal part of the Anti-Federalist argu-
ment; the lack of provision for civil juries was a prominent part
of this argument, and the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction
in law and in fact was treated by the Anti-Federalists as a virtual
abolition of the civil jury.'8
In Pennsylvania, the Anti-Federalists almost prevented the ratification
convention from occurring, largely because they believed the Federal-
ists were trying to abolish civil juries.'9 Similar sentiment was ex-
pressed in a variety of other states, most notably Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Virginia, New York, and Rhode Island.2" Eighteenth cen-
tury records uniformly emphasize the perceived importance of civil
jury rights as a limitation on governmental power, and thus a guaran-
tee of individual rights.2'
In exchange for a promise by the first Congress to pass a declara-
tion of individual rights as amendments to the Constitution, the Anti-
15. United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812)(No. 16,750).
16. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 495 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Men-
tor ed. 1961).
17. See Henderson, supra note 9, at 292. "One of the strongest objections originally
taken against the Constitution of the United States, was the want of an express provision
securing the right of trial by jury in civil cases." Parsons v. Bedford, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 433,
446 (1830).
18. Henderson, supra note 9, at 295.
19. See id. at 296-97. Professor Wolfram suggests that this sentiment by the Anti-Fed-
eralists may not have been for the pure love of individual liberties, so much as a recogni-
tion of a populist issue that would serve their goals. Wolfram, supra note 9, at 667-68.
20. Henderson, supra, note 9 at 298-99.
21. See Luther Martin, in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at
221-22 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) ("jury trials... have.., long been considered the surest
barrier against arbitrary power...").
Federalists allowed nine states to approve the Constitution.22 Of the
seven states that proposed amendments, six proposed language pro-
tecting civil jury rights. 3 The proposed amendments evolved, of
course, into the Bill of Rights.24 The Federalists were committed to
pass these amendments in the First Congress to avoid convening a
second constitutional convention. 25
James Madison was the first to introduce a draft of a bill of
rights. 6 One of his proposed provisions was the clear predecessor
language to the eventual final language of the Seventh Amendment:
"In suits at common law, between man and man, the trial by jury, as
one of the best securities to the rights of the people, ought to remain
inviolate."'27 Madison's proposed language gives an interesting view
of the type of suits that he considered appropriate for jury rights ("be-
tween man and man"). The implications of this language are perhaps
more meaningful for their omission from the final ratified version, and
provide an interesting presage to later debates over juries and sover-
eign immunity.
The key language in Madison's proposal is "In suits at common
law." Even before the First Congress, Alexander Hamilton recog-
nized the problem with language that defined the right to a jury trial
by reference to "common law."'  Hamilton's criticism was echoed in
the First Congress. Federalist Samuel Livermore, former Chief Justice
of New Hampshire, strongly opposed Madison's version of the Bill of
Rights, and in particular the language used in the Seventh Amend-
ment.29 He enunciated the basic concern that not every case was best
decided by a jury." Implicit in this opposition was that he understood
Madison's language as an absolute guarantee to a jury right in every
civil case. The predicate, "In suits at common law," did not limit the
set of civil jury rights in any manner whatsoever.
22. Wolfram, supra note 9, at 725.
23. DocuMErNTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, H.R.
Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1019, 1026, 1029, 1036, 1046, 1054 (1925).
24. Wolfram, supra note 9, at 725.
25. ld.
26. Id. at 726-27. Although Madison, as the author of the original Constitution, was
accused of opposing a bill of rights, he protested this characterization and claimed he sup-
ported amendments such as one protecting civil jury rights. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 11,
at 996-97.
27. Wolfram, supra note 9, at 727-28 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435 (1789)).
28. The Federalist No. 83, 523-28 (Alexander Hamilton) (Hebry Cabot Lodge ed.,
1808).
29. Wolfram, supra note 9, at 727-28.
30. Id. at 728-29, n.259.
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The first case interpreting the Seventh Amendment arose less
than twenty years after the passage of the Bill of Rights. In United
States v. Wonson,3' the defendant was prosecuted for failing to pay
penalties in accordance with the Embargo Supplementary Act of
1808.32 The defendant won at the trial court level, and the Govern-
ment appealed. Justice Story was asked to decide "whether the facts
are again to be submitted to a jury in this court, or the appeal submits
questions of law only for the consideration of the court., 33 Justice
Story found that the legislation creating appellate jurisdiction rejected
the notion of a second jury.3 4
Justice Story then turned to the constitutional clauses regarding
appeals. He reasoned that the Seventh Amendment was specifically
crafted to restrict the higher courts from nullifying the jury verdicts of
the lower courts.
More importantly, he recognized "how deeply the subject [of civil
jury rights] at th[e] time [of the drafting of the Seventh Amendment]
interested the several states. '36 He concluded that this gave insight
into the "scope and object of the amendment .... I' In other words,
Justice Story recognized that the Americans of the time felt civil jury
rights were of paramount importance, as reflected in the Seventh
Amendment, and therefore, the Amendment must define those rights.
Next, Justice Story interpreted the Seventh Amendment in refer-
ence to "common law." Federalist 83, with which Justice Story was
familiar,38 made clear that if "common law" was read as a reference to
American practice, then it provided no guideline at all. Each of the
thirteen states had its own corpus of common law rules. Conse-
quently, Justice Story was forced to conclude that "common law" re-
ferred to the law of England, the only other theoretically available
solution:
Beyond all question, the common law here alluded to is not the
common law of any individual state (for it probably differs in
all), but it is the common law of England, the great reservoir of
all our jurisprudence. It cannot be necessary for me to expound
31. 28 F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750).
32. Id.
33. 28 F. Cas. at 745. Story recounts how at least some states did have the practice of
second juries on appeal. Id. at 748.
34. Id. at 749-50.
35. Id. at 750 (relying on Hamilton's THE FEDERALIST No. 83).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. He cited it within his opinion. Id.
the grounds of this opinion, because they must be obvious to
every person acquainted with the history of the law.3 9
No court since has questioned Wonson's holding. As Professor Wolf-
ram notes, "No federal case decided after Wonson seems to have chal-
lenged this sweeping proclamation; perhaps later judges have
hesitated to appear to be the kind of intractable person that would
require Mr. Justice Story to elaborate on the obvious."4
The Wonson interpretation of the Seventh Amendment became
known as the "historical test."'" Under the historical test, in order to
determine whether a civil case carries a jury right, one must ask if the
claimant would have a right to a jury trial according to eighteenth
century common law principles. In 1898, the Supreme Court ex-
pressly recognized that the Sixth and Seventh Amendment's phrase
"trial by jury" not only meant that a case should be compared to Eng-
lish practice, but also that the comparison was fixed in time to English
practice in 1791.42
In the aftermath of the Wonson decision, the focus of most Sev-
enth Amendment analyses has been to determine the applicability of
the Seventh Amendment's jury trial provision in individualized cases.
There have been a handful of instances, however, where judges or
commentators have reaffirmed the underlying purpose of the Seventh
Amendment. The most ringing reaffirmation is found in Green v.
United States.43 A dissenting opinion by Justices Black, Warren, and
Douglas reaffirmed that primary among the precepts underlying the
Constitution was that the people of the time
deeply feared and bitterly abhorred the existence of arbitrary,
unchecked power in the hands of any government official ....
A great concern for protecting individual liberty from even the
possibility of irresponsible official action was one of the momen-
tous forces which led to the Bill of Rights. And the ... Seventh
39. Id. If Justice Story had tried to explain the basis for his assertion that "common
law" referred to England, he would have found the task nearly impossible. There is no
recorded legislative history suggesting that the phrase "common law" referred to the com-
mon law of England. Nor is support found in the records of the state debates, the Federal-
ist Papers, or the writings of commentators of the time. Indeed, Hamilton's concerns seem
to suggest the opposite. THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton). His assertion
had no documentable basis. See David L. Shapiro and Daniel R. Coquillette The Fetish of
Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARV. L. REv. 442, 448-49
(1971).
40. Wolfram, supra note 9, at 641.
41. See, e.g., id. at 639.
42. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898). See also, Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S.
474, 476 (1935).
43. 356 U.S. 165 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
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[Amendment was] directly and purposefully designed to confine
the power of courts and judges ....
The Justices recognized that in the eighteenth century Americans con-
sidered trial by jury a "birth right of free men," and that their zealous
determination to protect that birth right led to the passage of the Sev-
enth Amendment. 45
Similar reaffirmations appear in other cases. In Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co.,4 Judges Rubin, Wisdom, Johnson, and Wil-
liams of the Fifth Circuit wrote, "The Seventh Amendment preserves
the right of trial by jury, ... thus, interposing the civil jury as an im-
portant constraint on the power of government."'47 In Standard Oil
Co. v. Arizona,' the Ninth Circuit held that the Seventh Amendment
arose as a consequence of "concern over the broad powers of federal
government under the new constitution. '49 Similarly, in Frank Irey,
Jr., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission,50 a
dissenting Judge Gibbons in the Third Circuit wrote that the people
insisted upon the Seventh Amendment because they were "fearful of
the aggrandizement of power in the national government."51 Finally,
Professor Wolfram, a noted scholar of the Seventh Amendment, al-
ludes to the same notion behind the right to a jury trial: "It is familiar
legend that juries in civil cases were intended to guard private litigants
against the oppression of judges. '52 According to Wolfram, the Anti-
Federalists, who were the driving force behind the amendment,
wished to interpose juries between judges and the general populace.53
In summary, the focus of Seventh Amendment analysis largely
has been to determine the Amendment's application to particular
cases. In the instances where judges or commentators have had occa-
sion to comment on the rationale of the Seventh Amendment, how-
ever, most have recognized the Amendment's purpose as a variant of
populism. The Seventh Amendment essentially interposes a citizen
check on governmental power, especially in the federal courtroom. 4
44. Id. at 209.
45. Id.
46. 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990) (Rubins, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 236.
48. 738 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1984).
49. Id. at 1029.
50. 519 F.2d 1200 (3rd Cir. 1975) (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 1208.
52. Wolfram, supra note 9, at 708.
53. Id. at 670-72.
54. See Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE LJ. 1131, 1182-
99 (1991). Professor Amar also discusses other rationales that he believes complemented
1022
H. The Evolution of the Traditional Doctrine of Public
Rights
A. Creation of the Public Rights Doctrine
Parallel to the development of the historical test of the Seventh
Amendment, the Framers and the courts began to develop the notion
of public rights. "Public rights" is defined by the courts as those dis-
putes involving federal government action.' Contemporaneously, the
courts considered whether so-called "public rights" cases were exempt
from the constitutional constraints applicable to other cases.
In two places the Constitution explicitly speaks to the scope of
the judiciary, and to specific rights attendant with civil trials. First,
Article III creates the Judiciary, comprising the Supreme Court and
such inferior courts as Congress creates. The power of the judicial
branch extends to:
all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassa-
dors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admi-
ralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two
or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another
State;-between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens
of the same State claiming Lands under the Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects. 56
Second, the Seventh Amendment provides: "In Suits at common law,
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right
of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than accord-
ing to the rules of the common law."57
On their face, these two provisions set forth a broad outline of an
independent judiciary. The provisions, however, can be problematic
when considered in context with other bodies of law. Two issues arise
from these provisions that are pertinent to this Article. First, Articles
I and II of the Constitution give broad, comprehensive grants of
power to the executive and legislative branches. The exercise of exec-
utive or legislative power inevitably leads to conundrums, and thus
the populism rationale. Id. But see Robert C. Palmer, Akhil Amar: Elitist Populist and
Anti-Textual Textualist, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 397, 408-14 (1992).
55. See infra text accompanying notes 60-70.
56. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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necessitates dispute resolution forums. When, in the exercise of its
power, the executive or legislative branches require such forums, do
they then have the power to create their own courts, or are they re-
quired to rely on the judiciary? Second, because the "common law"
of eighteenth century England arguably did not include a right to sue
the sovereign, does the wording of Article III, referring to
"[c]ontroversies to which the United States shall be a Party," consti-
tute a waiver of sovereign immunity; or alternatively, do Article III
and the Seventh Amendment simply not apply to suits to which the
government is a party?5 8
Both of the issues go to the heart of sovereignty in a multi-branch
democracy. Perhaps then, it was inevitable that what became the
traditional definition of public rights emerged, initially, from the class-
ical concept of sovereign immunity5 9
B. The Sovereign Immunity Rationale
The idea was simple-if the sovereign could only be sued with its
consent, then perhaps it could condition its consent to the institution
of certain procedures in the action. The Supreme Court addressed
this issue in Den v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.60 In this case,
often referred as the case of Murray's Lessee,61 a dispute arose be-
tween two claimants to the same real estate - one who took under
lineal title and the other who was a bona fide purchaser from the
United States. The Government had obtained the land when the
Treasury Department executed on a lien. The lineal title claimant
challenged the validity of the Government's action because Congress
had passed a statute requiring the Treasury Department to obtain cer-
tain findings in federal court before it could execute on a lien. Ac-
cording to the lineal title claimant, this Congressional act modified,
and therefore violated, the Constitution's delineation of federal juris-
diction. The Court, however, held that, "there are matters, involving
public rights, which may be presented in such form that the judicial
power is capable of acting on them ... which Congress may or not
58. Sovereign immunity, of course, presupposes that the government is a defendant.
But, as became apparent in the federal courts, the doctrine also can arise when the govern-
ment is a counter-claimant. See McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426 (1880).
59. See Den v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 283-85
(1856); see also Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. 458 U.S. 50, 67
(1982) ("This doctrine may be explained in part by reference to the traditional principle of
sovereign immunity .... ).
60. 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 272.
61. See, e.g., Atlas Roofing Co. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430
U.S. 442, 450-51 (1977).
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bring within the cognizance of the courts.., as it may deem proper. '
By this holding, the Court coined the phrase "public rights" as a refer-
ence to those sets of cases in which the federal government was a
party.
This classification of public rights cases had deep repercussions;
the Court quickly held that public rights cases did not carry the same
constitutional guarantees as other cases. By implication, this means
that in public rights cases the government could provide as many or as
little procedural safeguards as it chose. In particular, perhaps public
rights cases were not subject to Article III and the Seventh
Amendment.
The scope of the public rights exception immediately became an
important question. The first drift in the direction of expansion
emerged in 1929 in Ex parte Bakelite Corp.63 In Bakelite, the Court
faced the question of the constitutionality of "legislative courts. '6 4 ,
The Tariff Act of 1922 allowed the President to impose tariffs to pro-
tect domestic industry and to set up a Tariff Commission to conduct
hearings.65 A party opposing imposition of a tariff could appeal ad-
verse rulings of the Tariff Commission to the Court of Customs Ap-
peals.66 Bakelite had sought and obtained a tariff recommendation.
Bakelite opposed the appeal on jurisdictional grounds, claiming that
an inferior federal court could only hear cases or controversies, and
that tariffs were executive actions, and therefore not judicially cogni-
zable "cases and controversies."'67 The Supreme Court rejected this
argument, holding that the Court of Customs Appeals was a legisla-
tive court, not a constitutional court.6" In other words, as to matters
which are purely within the purview of the legislative or executive
branches, these branches may reserve to themselves the power either
to create new forums for decision-making, or to delegate adjudicatory
power to judicial tribunals.69 For example, the Court referred to the
Court of Claims, noting:
It was created, and has been maintained, as a special tribunal to
examine and determine claims for money against the United
States. This is a function which belongs primarily to Congress as
an incident of its power to pay the debts of the United States.
62. Id. at 284-85 (emphasis added).
63. 279 U.S. 438 (1929).
64. Id at 451-52.
65. Id. at 446.
66. Id
67. Id. at 447-48.
68. Id. at 448-61.
69. Id. at 451.
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But the function is one which Congress has a discretion either to
exercise directly or to delegate to other agencies.70
The Bakelite Court's characterization of the Court of Customs
Appeals as a "legislative" court heralded potential expansion of the
public rights doctrine. By definition, all proceedings in the Tariff
Commission involved the government as a party. Therefore, Bakelite
could have been decided simply by reference to the sovereign immu-
nity basis of the public rights doctrine. The Court emphasized the leg-
islative character of the Tariff Commission, however, foreshadowing a
potential second, emerging rationale underlying the public rights doc-
trine-separation of powers.
C. The Emergence of the Separation of Powers Rationale
The Court would speak to the separation of powers rationale
more explicitly three years later in Crowell v. Benson.7 Crowell was a
deputy commissioner of the United States Employees' Compensation
Commission.72 Crowell found Benson liable for injuries sustained by
an employee of Benson's.73 Benson challenged the award on several
grounds, including that the Commission's award unconstitutionally vi-
olated the Seventh Amendment.74 In the course of rejecting this con-
tention, the Court held: "[T]he distinction is at once apparent between
cases of private right and those which arise between the Government
and persons subject to its authority in connection with the perform-
ance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative de-
partments. ' 75 Citing Murray's Lessee and Bakelite, the Court held
that as to matters "which from their nature do not require judicial
determination and yet are susceptible of it," Congress can reserve the
power, delegate it to the executive, or commit it to judicial tribunals.7
D. The Two Rationales: Conjunctive or Disjunctive?
The two rationales for the public rights doctrine, sovereign immu-
nity and separation of powers, carry the potential of greatly expanding
the number of cases falling within the doctrine.77 Sovereign immunity
70. Id. at 452.
71. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
72. Id. at 36.
73. Id. at 36-37.
74. Id
75. Id. at 50.
76. Id. at 50-51.
77. Later portions of this Article present an extended discussion of the parameters and
validity of both sovereign immunity and separation of powers. See infra parts H, VI.B.1,
VII.A. Presently, the classical definitions are sufficient. Sovereign immunity "precludes
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only applies to cases where the government is a party. Separation of
powers, on the other hand, applies to cases that arise under the broad
grants of Article I or Article II. Thus, the breadth of the public rights
doctrine turns on whether only one or both of the rationales must
apply for a case to fall within its scope. If a dispute is a public rights
case only when both rationales apply, then the number of cases cov-
ered by the doctrine is relatively small. One might refer to this as a
"conjunctive" rationale requirement. On the other hand, if a dispute
is a public rights case any time either of the rationales applies, then
the number of cases covered by the public rights doctrine is quite
large. This occurs where the rationales are "disjunctive." The express
language of the Crowell decision indicates that the rationales are
conjunctive. 78
Not until fifty years after Crowell did the Court again give any
serious focus to the scope of the public rights doctrine.79 In 1980,
Northern Pipeline filed a petition for reorganization. Pursuant to the
Bankruptcy Act, it filed suit in bankruptcy court against Marathon
Pipe Line alleging claims including fraud and breach of contract.80
Marathon argued that the suit could not proceed except in an Arti-
cle III court. Defending the constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Act,
Northern asserted that bankruptcy was one of those pure legislative
matters that, under the public rights doctrine, Congress could deal
with however it wished."' This argument, of course, relied heavily on
the "separation of powers" rationale for the public rights doctrine.
The Court rejected the argument, holding that a dispute between
a debtor and a creditor involved only private rights, even if resolved in
bankruptcy court.8 2 Only a four-Justice plurality, however, could
agree that the underpinnings of the public rights doctrine must con-
join for the public rights exception to apply. The plurality opined that
the doctrine extends only to matters to which the government is a
[a] litigant from asserting an otherwise meritorious cause of action against a sovereign or a
party with sovereign attributes unless [the] sovereign consents to suit." BLACK'S LAw Dic-
TIONARY 1252 (5th ed. 1979). Separation of powers captures the notion that in a tripartite
form of government, "[o]ne branch is not permitted to encroach on the domain of an-
other." Id. at 1225.
78. 285 U.S. at 50 ("the distinction is at once apparent between cases of private rights
and those which arise between the Government and persons ... in connection with...
constitutional functions .... ).
79. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 53, 67
(1982).
80. Id. at 56.
81. Id. at 63-64, 67-70.
82. Id. at 71-72.
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party, and then only to matters that constitutionally can be deter-
mined exclusively by the executive or legislative departments.8 3 The
test for this separation of powers prong, as explained by the plurality,
is a historical one: "[T]he Framers expected that Congress would be
free to commit [certain] matters completely to nonjudicial executive
determination, and that as a result, there can be no constitutional ob-
jection to Congress' employing the less drastic expedient of commit-
ting their determination to a legislative court or an administrative
agency." s The plurality offered a way to determine which matters
were inherently judicial and which were inherently nonjudicial. They
looked to the law of England and the states at the time the Constitu-
tion was adopted "in order to determine whether the issue presented
was customarily cognizable in the courts."85
In addition to the four-Justice plurality opinion in Northern Pipe-
line, the five other justices filed a total of three other opinions.8 6
Although none of these opinions directly challenged the plurality's
conclusion that public rights cases must involve the government as a
party, the opinions were all either silent on the issue or obliquely criti-
cal of the conclusion.87 As a result, Northern Pipeline raised anew the
controversy over the scope of the public rights doctrine.
HI. The Public Rights Doctrine Emerges as a Restriction to
the Scope of the Seventh Amendment
The renewed examination of the scope of the public rights doc-
trine threatened to impinge directly on the vitality of the Seventh
Amendment. Throughout the 150 years of the public rights doctrine's
evolution, the Court recognized the doctrine as a vehicle to exempt
cases from otherwise pertinent provisions of the Constitution (Arti-
cle III and the Seventh Amendment). Simply put, under the theory of
sovereign immunity the government'could not be held accountable for
83. Id. at 67-68.
84. Id. at 68.
85. Id. Interestingly, while the Court has never satisfactorily recognized the weak-
nesses of the historical test as a method of testing the meaning of "common law" in the
Seventh Amendment, the Court immediately recognized the problem of such a test to
define the public rights doctrine. Indeed, in Northern Pipeline, the Court explicitly com-
mented that "[t]he distinction between public rights and private rights has not been defini-
tively explained in precedents." Id. at 69. But, the plurality held it was not necessary to do
so in Northern Pipeline, because "a matter of public rights must at a minimum arise 'be-
tween the Government and others,"' and in Northern Pipeline, the Government was not a
party. Id. at 69-71.




its actions unless it expressly consented. Under the separation of
powers doctrine, matters deemed legislative or executive in nature
were wholly outside of the scope of judicial review. The cases recog-
nizing a public rights exception to the Seventh Amendment also re-
flected a tension between the two rationales, because the number of
cases susceptible to the doctrine could expand or contract depending
on whether the cases required conjunctive or disjunctive rationales.
The first Supreme Court decision to address a public rights excep-
tion to the Seventh Amendment was McElrath v. United States.8" In
McElrath, a lieutenant in the Navy filed suit in the Court of Claims
challenging his discharge.89 The Government counterclaimed for
amounts already paid him." The Court of Claims found for the Gov-
ernment on its counterclaim and the lieutenant appealed, arguing that
the statute empowering the Court of Claims to render judgment in
favor of the United States violated the Seventh Amendment. 91 The
Court rejected this claim, holding:
Suits against the government in the Court of Claims... are not
controlled by the Seventh Amendment. They are not suits at
common law within its true meaning. The government cannot
be sued, except with its own consent. It can declare in what
court it can be sued, and prescribe the forms of pleading and the
rules of practice to be observed in such suits.92
Essentially, the McElrath court relied upon the sovereign immunity
branch of the public rights doctrine to hold that the Seventh Amend-
ment's term "common law" did not encompass suits involving the
sovereign.
The significance of McElrath as a sovereign immunity case be-
came more apparent 30 years later when the Court decided Hepner v.
United States.93 Hepner involved a suit brought directly by the United
States. Under a 1903 statute, the United States could sue private citi-
zens for violations of certain immigration laws.94 The United States
brought such a suit against Hepner and won on directed verdict.95 Be-
cause the case was decided on a directed verdict, the appeal addressed
the jury rights of the parties. The Court ruled:
88. 102 U.S. 426 (1880).
89. Id. at 426-27.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 439.
92. Id. at 440.
93. 213 U.S. 103 (1909).
94. Id. at 104-05.
95. Id. at 105.
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[D]efendant was, of course, entitled to have a jury summoned in
this case, but that right was subject to the condition, fundamen-
tal in the conduct of civil actions, that the court may withdraw a
case from the jury and direct a verdict according to the law if the
evidence is uncontradicted and raises only a question of law.96
Thus, Hepner illustrates that the mere presence of the United States
as a party did not, ipso facto, implicate the public rights doctrine and
create an exception to the Seventh Amendment. Rather, the Govern-
ment was required to be either a defendant or a counterclaimant. As
with McElrath, the reasoning of Hepner clearly saw public rights as a
sovereign immunity concept.
This point again was reinforced five years later in United States v.
Regan.97 There, the United States again sued to recover for violations
of immigration laws.98 One of the issues in the case was whether the
action by the United States was fundamentally criminal or civil in na-
ture. The Court decided that the action was civil in nature and, there-
fore, the defendant was entitled under the Seventh Amendment to
have the issues tried before a jury.99 Regan indicated that when Con-
gress delegated a matter to the district courts, that delegation, at least
as to civil matters, brought the case within the scope of the Seventh
Amendment. Similarly, Regan continued to support the view of pub-
lic rights as a sovereign immunity concept.
The first case to deviate from this view was United States v.
Pfitsch.100 Pfitsch involved the Lever Act, which allowed a citizen to
challenge the amount of compensation the Government awarded after
requisitioning war supplies.1 1 The Court first addressed whether the
Supreme Court had jurisdiction on direct writ of error, a question
which turned on whether the Lever Act intended to confer trial court
jurisdiction concurrently on the district court and the Court of
Claims. 0 12 The answer to this question also "determine[d] incidentally
whether plaintiffs who proceed under [the Act] are entitled to a trial
by jury."'01 3 The Court interpreted the legislative history of the Lever
Act to reflect Congress' intent to confer jurisdiction exclusively to the
district court. 04 The Court then reasoned by extension that where a
96. Id. at 115.
97. 232 U.S. 37 (1914).
98. Id. at 40.
99. Id. at 46-48.
100. 256 U.S. 547 (1921).
101. Id. at 548.
102. Id. at 549.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 550-52.
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statute "designates a jurisdiction in which the trial will be with a jury
[an Article III court] instead of one where the trial will be by the court
alone [an Article V court], it is our duty to give effect to its designa-
tion."'' 0 By deciding the case in this fashion, Pfitsch was the first deci-
sion to reference the separation of powers branch of the public rights
doctrine. The thrust of Pfitsch is that if Congress delegated a power
exclusively to the judiciary, then the normal constitutional guarantees
controlling the judiciary would control the case.' 0 6
While Pfitsch foreshadowed analysis of Seventh Amendment is-
sues under the separation of powers branch of the public rights doc-
trine, that shift did not occur quickly. Instead, in Galloway v. United
States,10 7 the Court returned to deciding Seventh Amendment issues
under the sovereign immunity branch. The plaintiff, Galloway, sought
benefits for total and permanent disability by reason of insanity. 08
The trial court granted a directed verdict for the Government. 09 Gal-
loway claimed that the directed verdict deprived him of his right to
trial by jury.1 0 The Supreme Court rejected this claim, in part be-
cause "[ilt hardly can be maintained that under the common law in
1791 jury trial was a matter of right for persons asserting claims
against the sovereign."'
In Galloway, the Court implicitly suggested that the interplay be-
tween the Seventh Amendment and the public rights doctrine was
purely a sovereign immunity question, and not subject to a separation
of powers analysis. The Court explicitly took this position twenty
years later in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok." 2
Glidden involved two cases decided in legislative courts. 13 This
raised the question of what constitutional protections, if any, applied
to legislative courts. The Court, in a plurality opinion, stated:
Despite dictum to the contrary in United States v. Sherwood, the
legitimacy of [the] non-jury mode of trial [in the Court of Claims
on a Government cross-complaint] does not depend upon the
supposed [internal] "legislative" character of the court. It de-
rives instead ... from the fact that suits against the Government,
105. Id. at 553-54.
106. Since Pfitsch pre-dated both Crowell and Bakelite, it should not be surprising that
Pfitsch did not make an explicit reference to separation of powers or legislative courts.
107. 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
108. Id. at 372.
109. Id. at 373.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 388.
112. 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
113. IM. at 531-33.
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requiring as they do a legislative waiver of immunity, are not
"suits at common' law" within the meaning of the Seventh
Amendment.114
The Court made clear that the public rights doctrine exception to the
Seventh Amendment was derived entirely from the notion of sover-
eign immunity.
Glidden clarified the parameters of the public rights exception to
the Seventh Amendment. Public rights cases differed from other
cases because, where the government was a defendant (and at times a
cross-complainant), the government was a party only because it had
chosen to allow itself to be sued. In such instances, the government
could place whatever restrictions it wished on the litigation, including
an exemption from Seventh Amendment guarantees.
In 1977, these parameters of the public rights exception to the
Seventh Amendment changed in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Commission."' Atlas Roofing involved ad-
ministrative proceedings against employers in violation of the Occu-
pational Safety & Health Act of 1970. Under the Act, employers
could challenge the results of the proceedings by judicial review in the
federal courts. The employers contended that the Act violated the
Seventh Amendment because the administrative procedures did not
afford a right to a jury trial." 6 The Court rejected this claim, holding:
At least in cases in which "public rights" are being litigated-
e.g., cases in which the Government sues in its sovereign capac-
ity to enforce public rights created by statutes within the power
of Congress to enact-the Seventh Amendment does not pro-
hibit Congress from assigning the factfinding function and initial
adjudication to an administrative forum with which the jury
would be incompatible." 7
As this holding reflects, the Court rested its analysis of the public
rights exception to the Seventh Amendment on the notion of separa-
tion of powers. The Court concluded that "the cases.., stand clearly
for the proposition that when Congress creates new statutory 'public
rights,' it may assign their adjudication to an administrative agency
with which a jury trial would be incompatible, without violating the
Seventh Amendment's injunction that jury trial is to be 'preserved' in
'suits at common law.""'" Indeed, the Court even silently reaffirmed
the holding in Pfitsch by noting that the Seventh Amendment re-
114. Id. at 572 (citations omitted).
115. 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
116. Id. at 450.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 455.
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quired a jury where the adjudication was assigned to a federal court of
law instead of an administrative agency." 9
Atlas Roofing had the effect of both expanding and defining the
parameters of the expanded rationale of the public rights exception to
the Seventh Amendment. Prior to Atlas Roofing, the separation of
powers aspect of the public rights doctrine was never interpreted to
implicate jury rights. After Atlas Roofing, however, separation of
powers considerations became crucial in evaluating Seventh Amend-
ment rights.120 As the Atlas Roofing decision made clear, Congress
could not simply codify traditional rights and then assign adjudication
of those rights to administrative courts. Rather, in order for the Sev-
enth Amendment to be exempt from administrative proceedings, the
statute had to create a new, previously unknown right, and the govern-
ment had to be a party to the dispute in adjudication of that right.'21
Therefore, both aspects of the public rights doctrine had to conjoin to
exempt a case from the Seventh Amendment.
IV. The Public Rights Doctrine Expands
The evolving definition and rationale of the public rights doctrine
from Murray's Lessee to Atlas Roofing only subtly addressed the in-
herent tension between the two rationales. In the late 1980s, the
Supreme Court confronted this tension and settled upon a new, ex-
panded notion of the public rights doctrine. The issue arose in
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co." 2 Thomas in-
volved a challenge to the constitutionality of the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), a statute providing for in-
formation-sharing of scientific pesticide discoveries. Under FIFRA, if
private parties did not reach agreement on data consideration and
compensation schemes, the Environmental Protection Agency could
force resolution of these issues through binding arbitration. The ap-
pellees contended that Article III barred Congress from requiring ar-
bitration of disputes among registrants concerning compensation
119. Id.; see also id at 457-58 (noting that juries always are available for adjudicating
private rights in court, but can be restricted in other fora).
120. A few years later, in Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156 (1981), the Court made
clear that while the focus of the public rights exception to the Seventh Amendment may
have shifted to separation of powers, sovereign immunity was still a valid basis for the
exception. Id. at 160-61.
121. Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 449, 460.
122. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
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under FIFRA without also affording substantial review of the arbitra-
tor's decision by tenured judges"-3
One of the alternative bases supporting appellee's argument was
their contention that FIFRA confers a "private right" to compensa-
tion, requiring either Article III adjudication or review by an Arti-
cle III court. 24 This argument rested on the distinction between
public and private rights as in the plurality opinion of Northern Pipe-
line."-5 Appellees urged that, under Northern Pipeline, Crowell, and
Murray's Lessee, the public rights doctrine only applied when the fed-
eral government was a party of record. 26 In Thomas the Court re-
jected this argument. 2 7 The Court concluded that the public rights
doctrine reflected a "pragmatic understanding that when Congress
selects a quasi-judicial method of resolving matters that 'could be con-
clusively determined by the Executive and Legislative Branches,' the
danger of encroaching on the judicial powers is reduced."' 28 The
Court then held that "Congress, acting for a valid legislative purpose
pursuant to its constitutional powers under Article I, may create a
seemingly 'private' right that is so closely integrated into a public reg-
ulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution
with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary."' 29 The Court's
holding embraced a vision of the public rights doctrine that focused
almost exclusively on the separation of powers rationale and that ig-
nored the sovereign immunity rationale. Thus, the Court embraced
an undeniably expansive view of public rights. 30
V. The Expansion of Public Rights Eviscerates the Historical
Intent of the Seventh Amendment
Once the Court decided Northern Pipeline and Thomas, thus ex-
panding the entire notion of public rights, it was inevitable that the
123. Id. at 582.
124. Id. at 585; see also Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458
U.S. 50, 70 (1982) (only public rights controversies may be removed from Article III
courts).
125. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 585. See also supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 586.
128. Id. at 589 (citing Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 68 and Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S.
22, 50 (1932)).
129. Id. at 593-94.
130. See also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986)
(CFTC may entertain state law counterclaims without violating Article III).
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public rights exception to the Seventh Amendment would expand.
This inevitability was realized in Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg.'31
Granfinanciera, like Northern Pipeline, was a bankruptcy deci-
sion. A trustee in bankruptcy filed a claim challenging an alleged
fraudulent conveyance. One of the issues on appeal was the bank-
ruptcy court's denial of the request for a jury trial. The Eleventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's holding that the
Seventh Amendment did not supply a right to a jury trial because
fraudulent conveyances are equitable in nature and do not meet the
Seventh Amendment's requirement of a case arising "under common
law."'1 32 This issue came before the Supreme Court. In resolving the
issue, the Court provided the contemporary form of Seventh Amend-
ment rights analysis and its interplay with the public rights doctrine.
The Court began by defining a dual inquiry. First, applying the
Wonson historical test, the Court had to determine whether the case
fell within the Seventh Amendment's scope. Second, if the case was
within the scope of the Seventh Amendment, the Court had to deter-
mine whether the public rights exception applied. 133
The Court devoted several pages of historical analysis to support
its conclusion that fraudulent conveyances were within the scope of
"common law" under the Seventh Amendment. The Court concluded
that "[u]nless Congress may and has permissibly withdrawn jurisdic-
tion over that action by courts of law and assigned it exclusively to
non-Article III tribunals sitting without juries, the Seventh Amend-
ment guarantees petitioners a jury trial upon request."'1 34 This holding
directly implicated the public rights exception to the Seventh
Amendment.
Next, the Court turned to an analysis of the public rights doctrine,
beginning by defining the range of cases where the doctrine would be
invoked. The Court stated that wholly private tort, contract, and
property cases would never be public rights cases.' 35 On the other
hand, Congress was free to devise novel causes of action involving
public rights free from the strictures of the Seventh Amendment. 36
Thus, Granfinanciera foretold the inevitable expansive interpretation
of the public rights exception to the Seventh Amendment.
131. 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
132. Id. at 37.
133. Id. at 42.
134. Id. at 49.
135. Id. at 51.
136. Id.
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The Court, however, recognized that limitations on the expansive
application of the doctrine were necessary. Without any limitations,
the public rights doctrine posed the danger of eviscerating the Seventh
Amendment's guarantee by assigning to administrative agencies or
courts of equity all causes of action not grounded in state law.137 On
the other hand, limiting the scope of the public rights exception raised
the issue of the potential of the Seventh Amendment to choke already
crowded federal courts. 38 Based on this latter concern, the Court
held that Congress had the right to fashion "closely analogous" causes
of action to common law claims and place them beyond the ambit of
the Seventh Amendment. 39
This holding placed the entire emphasis of public rights analysis
on the separation of powers rationale of the public rights doctrine.
Indeed, the Court went on to state that "[t]he crucial question[] is
whether 'Congress, acting for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to
its constitutional powers under Article I, [has] create[d] a seemingly
"private" right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory
scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with lim-
ited involvement by the Article III judiciary."" 4 Explaining further,
the Court stated that "[t]hose cases in which Congress may decline to
provide jury trials are ones involving statutory rights that are integral
parts of a public regulatory scheme and whose adjudication Congress
has assigned to an administrative agency or a specialized court of eq-
uity."'' The Court emphasized, however, that Congress could not
take away a pre-existing, common law cause of action from the scope
of the Seventh Amendment "merely by relabeling the cause of action
to which it attaches and placing exclusive jurisdiction in an administra-
tive agency or specialized court of equity."' 42
In Granfinanciera, Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, identi-
fied the threat that an expansive interpretation of the public rights
exception poses to the Seventh Amendment. He noted that from
1856 until 1985, the public rights doctrine required that the govern-
ment be a party to the litigation. 43 While the Court's decision in
Thomas changed this notion, Justice Scalia argued that Thomas was
137. Id. at 52.
138. Id. at 51 n.9.
139. Id. at 52.
140. Id. at 54 (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568,593-94
(1985)).
141. Id. at 55 n.10.
142. Id. at 61.
143. Id. at 68 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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"entirely inconsistent with the origins of the public rights doctrine.' 144
Reviewing Murray's Lessee, the recognized source of the public rights
doctrine, Justice Scalia noted that "[ilt is clear that what we meant by
public rights were not rights important to the public, or rights created
by the public, but rights of the public-that is, rights pertaining to
claims brought by or against the United States."' 45 The reason for this
was simple-public rights turned on the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity and the waiver of sovereign immunity; these issues did not arise
unless the government was a party to the case. 46 Thus, Justice Scalia
accused the Court of both ignoring the origins of the public rights doc-
trine and expanding its definition "by sheer force of our office.""' 7
Finally, as Justice Scalia noted, this trend was based on reasons having
little to do with the Constitution, but more to do with the pragmatic
concerns of Congress and the courts. 48
The potential consequences of the Granfinanciera decision are
vast. The advent of administrative law, the preemptive effect of statu-
tory regulation, the increasing frequency of procedural disposition of
cases, and the financial pressures on Congress to get control of the
federal budget, can work in concert with Granfinanciera to exempt
ever-widening sets of cases from the Seventh Amendment. Now, even
common law claims may have dubious Seventh Amendment protec-
tion in administrative courts. 49 Common law claims can arise in any
variety of Article I courts beyond bankruptcy courts.150 Yet once a
common law claim is in an Article I court, its Seventh Amendment
protection is virtually destroyed. Administrative law judges do not
144. Id. at 66.
145. Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 69.
148. Id.
149. As one commentary observes, "almost any private, common-law sort of action
may be converted by Congress to a matter of public right and thereby moved outside the
zone of Article III courts." ALFRED AMAN & WILLIAM MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
126 (1993).
150. In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986), which
preceded Granfinanciera, the Supreme Court considered the argument that the Commod-
ity Futures Trading Commission lacked authority to adjudicate common law claims. Id. at
835. The Supreme Court recognized that the traditional model of agency adjudications did
not anticipate deciding common law claims, but that a legislative court nonetheless did
have the legal right to do so. Id. at 851-52. While common law rights are the classical
bailiwick of Article III courts, an Article I court deciding common law claims does not
violate separation of powers. Id. at 851-57.
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empanel juries (and might not have the power to do so).151 Further,
even if an administrative law judge could empanel a jury in disputes
involving common law claims, Justice Scalia predicts that the judiciary
will be inclined to simply relabel claims in order to strip them of com-
mon law protection in administrative courts. Simply put, if common
law counts can and do arise in Article I courts, then claims the
Supreme Court might characterize as not common law, but "closely
analogous" to common law claims, will become the norm. Given the
"amazing proliferation of twentieth-century administrative law
cases,"'5 2 these claims, which fall within the public rights exception,
could swallow the Seventh Amendment.
The remarkable aspect of this potential hole in Seventh Amend-
ment protection is that it has come into existence without any refer-
ence to the Seventh Amendment. The expansion of the public rights
doctrine has been purely a debate over whether sovereign immunity
or separation of powers forms the more compelling rationale for the
doctrine. Yet, if one of the primary consequences of any expansion of
the doctrine is a contraction of Seventh Amendment guarantees, this
factor should be weighed heavily in the evaluation of how to interpret
the public rights doctrine. The remainder of this Article demonstrates
that if the Court's analysis had proceeded along these lines, it might
have come to a much different result.
VI. The Illogic of a Seventh Amendment Exception for
Traditional Public Rights
If the Court had considered whether the public rights exception
would fit within the overall structure and rationale of the Seventh
Amendment, the Court would have addressed two questions:
(1) whether a public rights exception could fit within the "historical
test" that has come to define the scope of the Seventh Amendment,
and (2) if so, whether the rationale for a public rights exception out-
weighs the principles underlying the Seventh Amendment. Undertak-
ing this analysis, the Court would have concluded that the public
rights exception cannot coexist with the historical Seventh Amend-
ment test, and further, that the principles underlying the Seventh
151. Some commentators indeed postulate that the explanation of the public rights ex-
ception is the pragmatic realization that juries and agencies are incompatible. AMAN &
MAYtON, supra note 149, at 145-46.
152. Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1,
2 (1983).
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Amendment far outweigh those supporting the public rights
exception.
A. The Public Rights Exception to the Seventh Amendment Conflicts
with the Wonson Historical Test for Interpreting the
Amendment
As even Granfinanciera confirmed, interpretation of the Seventh
Amendment is governed by the Wonson historical test. While one
may cast doubt upon the validity of the historical test, 5 3 it is the stan-
dard rule of interpretation. Indeed, as the Court confirmed in
Granfinanciera, a near identical analysis is required to determine
whether a case is a public rights case.' 54 Therefore, in determining
whether traditional public rights cases (i.e., cases to which sovereign
immunity applied) fit within the literal language of the Seventh
Amendment, the Court should ask whether traditional public rights
cases would be "common law" cases under the eighteenth century
English justice system. In other words, at the time of the writing of
the Constitution, could the sovereign be sued in the common law
courts?
The simplistic formulation of the concept of sovereign immunity
is that the King was afforded blanket protection from legal claims.
Contemporary analysis has come to the conclusion that sovereign im-
munity was not grounded in the infallibility of the Crown, but rather
in the pragmatic recognition that in a feudal hierarchy, there was no
court above the King to correct his misdeeds.' According to this
view, even in medieval England the King was at most pragmatically,
not theoretically, absolutely immune from the law; and may not have
even been pragmatically immune.156
Yet regardless of the breadth of immunity in medieval England,
by the time of the eighteenth century, English common law certainly
did not provide the crown with absolute immunity. The Seventh
Amendment's "historical test" took into account the common law of
England in 1791. It is indisputable that in 1791, the sovereign could be
153. See Klein, supra note 9.
154. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 60-61; see also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational
Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442,460 (1977) (stating the Seventh Amend-
ment "took the existing legal order as it found it").
155. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 415 (1979); J. W. EHRLICH, EHRLICH'S BLACK-
STONE 66 (1959); 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MArLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 518 (1895).
156. See generally, Pawlett v. Attorney General, 145 Eng. Rep. Ex. 1668 (Hadres 465)
550, 551 (Ex 1668) (noting"... in natural justice redemption of a mortgage lies against the
King").
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 21:1013
sued in some circumstances in the common law courts of England.157
Therefore, the Seventh Amendment guaranteed a right to a jury trial
in some cases in which the government was a party. In other words,
the literal language of the Seventh Amendment did not justify the cre-
ation of a carte blanche public rights exception. 58
B. When Resolving the Conflict, the Public Rights Exception is
Outweighed by the Principles Underlying the Seventh
Amendment
While the literal language of the Seventh Amendment prohibits a
carte blanche public rights exception, it does allow for jury trials to be
curtailed in most claims involving the government. Thus, the next
step is to determine whether the rationale for the public rights excep-
tion outweighs the fundamental principles of the Seventh
Amendment.
I. Rationale Redux: A More Detailed Analysis of Sovereign Immunity
as a Justification for the Public Rights Exception
The classic rationale of the public rights exception is rooted in the
concept of sovereign immunity. The vitality of the public rights doc-
trine depends upon the legitimacy of sovereign immunity as an Ameri-
can doctrine. Prior to the Revolutionary War, the colonists had
adopted the concept of limited sovereign immunity.'59 Article III of
the Constitution, however, gave federal courts jurisdiction in suits be-
tween citizens and state/federal governments in the newly formed
United States.' 60 Article III's grant of jurisdiction arguably was an
implicit rejection of the entire concept of sovereign immunity. Recog-
nizing this tension, the authors of the Constitution debated whether
state sovereign immunity survived in the wake of Article III of the
Constitution. Alexander Hamilton believed that the inherent nature
of sovereignty meant that a state could not be sued without its con-
sent.' 6' He argued that suits against the government made no sense
because awards were unenforceable. 62 John Marshall agreed,' 63 ar-
157. Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77
HARv. L. REV. 1, 1-19 (1963).
158. "Historical... rationalizations... do not add up to a persuasive defense of the
doctrine." C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 150
(1972).
159. Id. at 151.
160. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
161. THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton).
162. Id.
163. 3 ELLIOTr'S DEBATES, supra note 10, at 555-56.
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guing that Article III simply allowed actions by states as plaintiffs.
James Madison echoed similar thoughts.164
On the other hand, Patrick Henry read Article III as a recogni-
tion that states could be sued in federal court.165 According to Henry,
in the aftermath of the Revolutionary War, many citizens held conti-
nental paper money which only had value if the holder could sue a
state to pay that state's proportion of the nominal value of the cur-
rency. Article III, therefore, was a specific recognition that such suits
could be brought. Henry's reading of Article III was shared by dele-
gates George Mason, 66 Edmond Randolph, 67 and James Wilson. 68
One can draw three conclusions from these views. First, the
Framers understood that the recognition of sovereign immunity was
not a philosophical imperative, but, rather, a choice. Second, the lan-
guage of Article III is open to interpretation, even the men who wrote
and ratified it were not in agreement as to the meaning of the lan-
guage. As Henry's comments reflect, there were practical, contempo-
raneous reasons why the founders had incentive to allow suits against
the state. On the other hand, Madison's comments reveal the appeal
of absolute sovereign immunity. Finally, the authors of the Constitu-
tion limited their debate to a discussion of whether state governments
would enjoy the protection of sovereign immunity. None of the com-
ments addressed the issue of the federal government's sovereign im-
munity. Yet it can be argued that Article III spoke to suits involving
the federal government as well as the states. Further, it can be argued
that a government by the people, for the people, and of the people
cannot in concept be immune from a suit by a citizen. 169 Thus, if the
language of Article III eliminated sovereign immunity for states, it
might also do so for the federal government.
The Supreme Court shaped all future debate about federal sover-
eign immunity with its decision in Chisholm v. Georgia,170 in which a
private citizen sued a state. The question in Chisholm was whether
Georgia had sovereign immunity. A majority of the Justices held that
164. Id. at 523.
165. Id. at 319.
166. Id. at 526-27.
167. Id. at 207.
168. 2 id. at 491 (2d ed. 1881).
169. JACOBS, supra note 158, at 152-53. For a tepid confirmation of the difference be-
tween king as sovereign and people as sovereign, see United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196,208
(1882).
170. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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Chisholm could sue Georgia. The various opinions, however, reveal
the nature of sovereign immunity in a democracy.
Chisholm presented, in essence, three alternative avenues of deci-
sion. First, the Court might have held that the concept of sovereign
immunity is incompatible with the inherent nature of democratic gov-
ernment. Therefore, any citizen can sue its democratic government,
whether that be the federal or state government. The second possibil-
ity was for the Court to recognize an inherent distinction between the
federal government and state governments that only permits the fed-
eral government to claim sovereign immunity. Finally, the Court
might have decided that the Constitution, by its terms, precluded ex-
ercise of sovereign immunity.
Mr. Randolph, the Attorney General of the United States,
presented Chisholm's case. He argued that in England-and, by ex-
tension, America-the preeminent power could only be sued with its
permission.17 1 He asserted that the United States could not be sued
because "the head of a confederacy is not within the reach of the judi-
cial authorities of its inferior members. It is exempted by its peculiar
pre-eminencies.' 17 1 But he also argued that the very text of the Con-
stitution contemplated suits against a state. 73 Therefore, Randolph
argued that sovereign immunity was not antithetical to democracy, but
was antithetical to both the nature of state governments and the words
of the Constitution.
None of the five Supreme Court justices accepted the entirety of
Randolph's argument, each writing separate opinions. Justice Iredell
recognized that, although the common law differed in each of the
states, it fundamentally reflected the common law of England. 74 Ac-
cording to Justice Iredell, each state was a fully independent sovereign
(except to the extent that it limited its sovereignty by agreement) and,
because each state adopted English law, a state could only be sued
with its permission, unless it agreed to otherwise limit its sover-
eignty.17 Under Justice Iredell's theory, the Constitution did not re-
flect a waiver of sovereign immunity. 76
171. Id. at 425. Mr. Randolph argued that petitions of right, monstrans de droit, and
even process in the exchequer, all were permissible only with the indulgence of the Crown.
Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 426-28.
174. Id. at 435-37.
175. Id. at 436.
176. Id. at 449-50.
Justice Blair based his discussion on constitutional construction.
From his point of view, the language of Article III by its terms con-
templated that a state could be sued. For him, this ended the inquiry.
He did not address the larger philosophical or political questions re-
garding the nature of state sovereignty or the possibility of federal
sovereign immunity.'77
Justice Cushing's approach was somewhat similar to Justice
Blair's. He believed that states could be sued under Article III of the
Constitution. Unlike Justice Blair, however, Justice Cushing chose to
address the larger question of whether a citizen could also sue the
federal government. He noted that Article III referred to controver-
sies between a state and citizens of a different state as distinct from
"controversies to which the United States shall be a party."' 78 Rely-
ing on this distinction, Justice Cushing concluded that Article III only
eliminated sovereign immunity for states.
Justice Wilson drafted the lengthiest opinion. By his own charac-
terization, he analyzed the case from three points of view: general ju-
risprudence, the laws and practice of historical states and kingdoms,
and the history and language of the United States Constitution. 79
Justice Wilson held to two basic predicates: First, that the notion of
sovereignty is not mentioned in the Constitution of the United
States, 10 and second, that in a democracy the source of all power, and
the apex of all power, is the individual citizen.' 8 ' While Justice Wilson
recognized that conceptually, in a feudal system, there could be no
one who could exercise power over the king,' 81 he also believed that
as a matter of jurisprudence and justice, laws were derived and
founded on the consent of those whose obedience they required. 83
Therefore, Justice Wilson ascribed sovereign immunity in England
only to its pragmatic origins, and not to any valid philosophical under-
pinning. Indeed, he referred to notions of state independence, state
sovereignty, and state supremacy as "haughty."'" Justice Wilson con-
cluded that the concept of sovereign immunity was philosophically an-
tithetical to any form of government, pragmatically antithetical to a
177. Id. at 450-53.
178. Id. at 469.
179. Id. at 453.
180. Id. at 455.
181. Id. at 455-61.
182. Id. at 458.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 461.
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democracy, and clearly not contemplated by the words of the
Constitution.
The final opinion was that of Chief Justice Jay. He believed that
the people of the United States were the heirs of the King's sovereign
power.' Chief Justice Jay therefore concluded that, while in a feudal
system the right to sue the sovereign is incompatible with the basic
theory of sovereignty, in a democratic system there is no such prob-
lem.'86 Nonetheless, Chief Justice Jay recognized that from a political
standpoint, no judgment against the United States could be enforced
without the acquiescence of the United States. By this, Chief Justice
Jay insinuated that, in America-much as in medieval England-sov-
ereign immunity might be a pragmatic reality while lacking any legiti-
mate philosophical basis. 87
The Chisholm decision evoked serious concern and led to the im-
mediate passage of the Eleventh Amendment. 88 As a result, Con-
gress constitutionally reinstated sovereign immunity for state
governments. 18 9
Perhaps the anomalous consequence of the passage of the Elev-
enth Amendment (which by its terms addressed only the rights of
state governments) was that it seemed to silence the interesting dis-
cussion begun in Chisholm v. Georgia regarding federal sovereign im-
munity. In Chisholm, only three of the five justices directly addressed
the issue of sovereign immunity for the federal government. One of
them, Justice Wilson, explicitly rejected sovereign immunity for the
federal government. Another, Chief Justice Jay, believed the concept
to be philosophically incongruous in a democratic government, but
also recognized that the federal government could achieve that practi-
cal result if it chose to. Justice Cushing believed the Constitution ex-
plicitly rejected sovereign immunity for state governments but not the
federal government, and voiced no opinion on the possibility of sover-
eign immunity for the federal government.
185. Id. at 470-71.
186. Id. at 471-73.
187. Id. at 478.
188. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890).
189. Although, even here, some argue that the Eleventh Amendment intended to waive
sovereign immunity to the extent it was waived in England. JACOBS, supra note 158, at 5,
20-21; Stewart A. Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. CoLo. L. REv.
139, 153-54 (1977). The Eleventh Amendment reads: "The Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prose-
cuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by Citizens of Sub-
jects of any Foreign State."
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Despite the debate captured in the five opinions of Chisholm, the
Supreme Court has never meaningfully returned to the discussion of
the philosophical underpinnings of sovereign immunity. Rather, the
next mention of sovereign immunity is a single sentence in Cohens v.
Virginia.9 ' In Cohens, Chief Justice Marshall wrote, "The universally
received opinion is that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted
against the United States; that the judiciary act does not authorize
such suits."' 9' Chief Justice Marshall assumed-without analysis-
that the federal government enjoys sovereign immunity, something
that the justices in Chisholm saw as a far more murky issue. Chief
Justice Marshall also assumed that sovereign immunity was absolute,
although that view does not comport with English common law at the
time of the formation of the American common law system. In any
event, Chief Justice Marshall's opinion foreshadowed that later courts
would address sovereign immunity as a closed issue.
11. Rationale Weighing: The Fundamental Principles of the Seventh
Amendment Override the Logic of a "Sovereign Immunity"
Exception
The principles underlying the Seventh Amendment, in contrast,
are unambiguous. The early Americans deeply distrusted govern-
ment, and were cynical and suspicious of any retention of power in a
central governing authority.'92 Thus, if federal judges were to have
lifetime tenure, then citizen juries were crucial to prevent kings in the
courtroom. 93 The principle captured in the Amendment is that the
specter of unchecked authority was unacceptable. x94
The convoluted rationale behind the public rights exception,
namely, the misguided application of sovereign immunity, does not
outweigh the fundamental principles of the Seventh Amendment. As
a theoretical matter, sovereign immunity had questionable validity as
a means to shield a government of, by, and for the people. At most, it
was a doctrine with limited appeal and vitality. Indeed, its weakness
190. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821).
191. Id.
192. As one commentary states, "The grand function of the civil jury has to be that of
rectifying and decentralizing government power according to community interests." AMAN
& WILLIAM, supra note 149, at 141. This suggests that it is backwards to find a public rights
exception (i.e. no jury) for agencies since agencies are the operation of government most
subject to political pressure and least responsive to the community. ld. at 142; see also
Colleen P. Murphy, Article II Implications for the Applicability of the Seventh Amendment
to Federal Statutory Actions, 95 YALE L.J. 1459, 1465-66 (1986).
193. Wolfram, supra note 9, at 667-725.
194. Id.
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was amply demonstrated by the subsequent frequency and breadth of
legislative waivers such as the Federal Torts Claims Act, and of crea-
tive countermeasures, such as the tactic of suing a federal officer in-
stead of the federal government. In contrast, the rationale of the
Seventh Amendment was to prevent precisely the sort of unchecked
government authority that the doctrine of sovereign immunity pur-
ported to preserve.- Frankly, there is no doctrine that would be more
offensive to the spirit of the Seventh Amendment than that of sover-
eign immunity.
VII. The Illogic of a Seventh Amendment Exception for the
Present Day Notion of Public Rights
As noted in Part IV, under the expanded definition of public
rights the doctrine is no longer grounded in sovereign immunity, but
rather in separation of powers. This justification for the doctrine fares
no better than sovereign immunity when measured against the princi-
ples underlying the Seventh Amendment.
A. Separation of Powers Is an Insufficient Philosophical Basis for an
Expanded Public Rights Exception
As the history of the public rights doctrine reflects, the separation
of powers branch of the public rights doctrine is an expansion of, and
derivative of, the sovereign immunity branch of the doctrine. As
demonstrated above, the sovereign immunity rationale of the public
rights doctrine is insufficient to support a public rights exception to
the Seventh Amendment. Therefore, if the expanded definition of
public rights cases is purely derivative of the traditional definition,
then the expanded exception also fails to justify a public rights
exception.
Recent Supreme Court decisions, however, have interpreted the
separation of powers rationale as an independent rationale. If separa-
tion of powers exists as an independent rationale for the public rights
doctrine, then it is necessary to ask if separation of powers, as a juris-
prudential concept, is itself a suspect doctrine.
One of the leading commentators on administrative law, Profes-
sor Kenneth Culp Davis, argues that separation of powers, at least as
a philosophical basis for administrative courts, is an illusory doc-
trine.195 As Professor Davis states, "[T]he theory of separation of
powers... [does not provide] any affirmative support for the rise of
195. 1 KENNETH DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 63-91 (2d ed. 1978).
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the administrative process.' 196 In summary, Professor Davis con-
cludes that there never has been true separation of powers.197 Rather,
the lines delineating the powers of the three branches of government
have always overlapped and blurred.198 He adds that, at best, we
might now "mold" separation of powers into a useful doctrine, but it is
philosophically incongruous to rest any jurisprudential concepts on
separation of powers. 199 Indeed, James Madison recognized even
before ratification of the Constitution that separation of powers could
not be absolute. 00 Thus, one must recognize that some analysts view
separation of powers as a weak doctrine.
In balancing the unsupported doctrine of separation of powers
against the strong philosophical principles underlying the Seventh
Amendment, one can only conclude that the public rights exception is
a spurious doctrine. The fundamental principle of the Seventh
Amendment was to reserve a portion of dispute resolution to the peo-
ple, not abandon it to the government. The people did not trust the
government. Therefore, it is again antithetical to the Seventh Amend-
ment to read into it an exception for government-supervised dispute
resolution.20 '
B. Separation of Powers is an Insufficient Jurisprudential Basis for an
Expanded Public Rights Exception
Ultimately, the question of whether separation of powers justifies
the creation of legislative courts and exempts certain disputes from
the Seventh Amendment, is largely moot. This is because that entire
analysis rests on the faulty premise that the Seventh Amendment only
applies to Article III courts. If one recognizes that the Seventh
196. Id. at 62-63.
197. Id. at 63-65. "The United States government does not operate and never has oper-
ated under a theory that legislative, executive, and judicial powers must be kept separate
and can never be mixed up together." Id. at 63.
198. Id. at 63-65. This was probably recognized as true even from the Constitution's
inception. See also, Joseph S. Sano, Note, A Literal Interpretation of Article 111 Ignores 150
Years of Article I Court History: Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Oil Pipe Line
Co., 19 NEw ENG. L. REV. 207, 233 (1983).
199. DAVIS, supra note 195, at 59,75-82. ("The administrative process has developed in
spite of the dominant theoretical thinking, not in response to it.... [S]eparation of pow-
ers... [has] been [a barrier] to the development .....
200. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
201. As one commentator notes, the early Americans' strong belief in limited govern-
ment was itself one of the reasons for embracing separation of powers in the first place.
Monaghan, supra note 152 at 32. Eighteenth century thinkers believed constitutional limits
extended beyond protection of private rights. Id. at 32 n.188.
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Amendment applies to the dispute resolutions of all claims sounding
in common law, then separation of powers becomes irrelevant.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has already resolved the ques-
tion. The Supreme Court has held that, if a common law claim arises
in an Article I court, that claim still carries a jury right.
In Granfinanciera, a common law claim arose in bankruptcy
court. Bankruptcy courts are, of course, merely one variant of an Ar-
ticle I court.2 °2 The Supreme Court held that although the common
law claim arose in an Article I court, the Seventh Amendment right to
a jury trial still applied.20 3 The Granfinanciera decision left open a
variety of questions, however. For instance, could the legislative court
impanel a jury, or did the case have to be transferred to an-Article III
court? Also, if the Article I court could: impanel a jury, would the
Article III court review of that decision require impanelling a second
jury? These mechanical questions are still unanswered.2'
Conclusion
We live in times when the pace of technological, sociological, and
structural change is ever-increasing. The nature of society, our sense
of morality and justice, and our views on jurisprudence, may only
faintly resemble the notions of our predecessors 200 years ago. Our
Founding Fathers, however, were far-sighted enough to anticipate that
the unexpected might come to pass. Therefore, they did not saddle us
with a rigid form of government, changeable only through revolution.
Rather, the Constitution sets forth a variety of mechanisms for
amendment. If the consensus of the people of the United States today
is that judges can be trusted, Congress can be trusted, and juries are
nettlesome, then the provisions of the Constitution can be changed to
reflect this new concept of the relationship between government and
the governed. Unless and until the Constitution is amended, our
courts and legislators should adhere to it. There is no basis for a pub-
lic rights exception to the Seventh Amendment, and our courts should
abandon any position to the contrary.
202. See, e.g., In re Investment Bankers, Inc., 4 F.3d 1556, 1561 (10th Cir. 1993).
203. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 63-64 (1989).
204. Id.
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